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Abstract 
 
In many retail and service sectors, firms have to establish a physical presence in a geographic market 
to access customers there. In countries where the quality of institutions is low, this can put assets at 
risk. We use data on the operations of a multinational, multi-brand hotel company to show that in 
environments where local institutions are weaker – as proxied mainly by the World Bank’s Checks 
index – the company eschews direct ownership. Rather than increasing its reliance on franchising, as 
predicted by some models, the company relies more on another form of organization commonly 
used in this industry, namely management contracts. We explain these patterns by emphasizing how 
the quality of the institutional environment affects the cost of using equity-based organizational 
forms, per arguments in the current literature, but also the cost of enforcing the terms of franchise 
contracts. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Economists and business scholars have devoted much attention to understanding how institutions 
affect economic behavior. An important part of this literature has focused on the effect of 
institutions, broadly defined, on economy-wide growth and performance (see, e.g., Acemoglu et al., 
2001, Levchenko, 2007, Dixit, 2009, and Bruhn and Gallego, 2012; see also Acemoglu et al., 2005 for 
a review of the economics literature). A smaller but growing set of papers considers the effect of 
institutions at a more micro level, often by examining how multinational corporations adapt to local 
market conditions. One branch of this literature has explored how factors like the rule of law (Liu et 
al., 2011), regulatory credibility (Levy and Spiller, 1994, Holburn and Zelner, 2010), property rights 
protection (Javorcik, 2004), corruption (Cuervo-Cazuna, 2006, Javorcik and Wei, 2009), the quality of 
the legal system (Laeven and Woodruff, 2007), and regulatory stability (Henisz and Zelner, 2001, 
Delios and Henisz, 2003) affect the level of (often foreign) investment. Another part of this literature 
has focused on how the type of investments and the organization of firm activities – e.g., ownership 
structures in foreign ventures – are affected by similar factors (e.g., Oxley 1999, Henisz, 2000, Asiedu 
and Esfahani, 2001, Javorcik 2004, Branstetter et al., 2006, Uhlenbruck et al., 2006, Chong and 
Gradstein, 2011, Bloom et al., 2012, Feenstra et al., 2012). 
One feature uniting the micro-level empirical literature on the effect of institutions on economic 
behavior is that it has been concerned almost exclusively with high-tech and manufacturing firms. Of 
course, institutional factors also affect firms in other sectors. In fact, in some other sectors, such as 
many retail and service industries, firms can access customers in markets only by being present 
locally. Thus, contrary to what occurs in manufacturing, firms in the retail and service sectors often 
must put assets at risk if they are to do business in a country: they cannot simply locate in, and 
export from, countries where both physical and intangible assets are better protected.  
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4 
Among retail and service firms, lodging companies are particularly susceptible to the types of 
expropriation and hold-up problems emphasized in the literature.1 In this paper, we develop a 
simple model to show how the existence of three modes of organization in this industry – 
franchising, company ownership, and management contracts – allows hotel firms to adjust to 
different local market conditions. We argue in particular that management contracts, which combine 
aspects of company ownership and franchising, give lodging firms the opportunity to protect 
themselves against expropriation risks while also protecting the value of their intangible assets, 
namely the value of their brands. We test the predictions of the model using a unique, proprietary 
data set with information on the organizational form under which all of the international hotels 
affiliated with a specific major multinational, multi-brand lodging company operate. A confidentiality 
agreement prohibits us from disclosing the name of the company or characteristics that might lead 
to its identification. We therefore refer to it as the Company, and keep all references to its 
operations and brands oblique. 
Our results imply that, consistent with evidence from the literature on high-tech and 
manufacturing firms mentioned above, the Company eschews asset ownership in markets where the 
quality of the institutional environment is low. However, rather than minimizing its involvement by 
turning over operational control to local partners, as would occur under franchising, the Company 
maintains control by relying instead on management contracts in these environments. We interpret 
these findings as evidence that in environments with lower quality institutions, the Company not 
only faces potential risks of expropriation, per arguments in the literature, but also major difficulties 
in enforcing franchise contract terms. The latter, in turn, can lead to important free-riding risks and 
potentially costly legal and other disputes under franchising, all of which are much less severe under 
management contracts given the level of control that this organizational form affords hotel firms.  
We show that our results are robust to a variety of alternative specifications. In particular, when 
we include separate variables designed to proxy for the risk of expropriation and the reliability of 
contract enforcement, we find that reductions in the risk of expropriation increase the likelihood 
that the Company uses an equity-intensive organizational form. At the same time, an increase in the 
                                                          
1
 See specific examples for hotels further below. However, these issues are not absent in other service sectors. 
See James (2008) for example. Recent troubles experienced by McDonald’s in Russia provide yet another 
example (see e.g., Gorst, 2014). 
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5 
likelihood that contracts can be enforced increases the utilization of both contract-based 
organizational forms, namely both franchising and management contracts, while reducing the 
reliance on company ownership.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe the three organizational forms in 
some detail, and present the arguments and framework we use to analyze the organizational form 
decisions of the Company. In Section 3, we discuss our data and methodology. We describe our 
results in Section 4, and conclude in Section 5. 
2. Organizational Form and the Institutional Environment  
 
2.1 Organizational Forms in the Lodging Industry 
 
Firms in the lodging industry, like those in several other service and retail sectors, can access 
customers in other countries only by being present locally. In many cases, firms choose between 
owning and operating an establishment directly and relying on a franchisee, who owns and operates 
the business locally. In the hotel industry, however, there is a third option: a hotel can be operated 
under what is called a management contract.2 The characteristics of these three organizational 
forms are as follows: 
 
Company-owned and operated: The Company is the equity owner. The hotel’s managers 
are employees of the Company. The compensation of these employees may involve some 
incentive payments, but the contracts are low powered compared to those of franchisees 
who are residual claimants on their hotel’s profit stream (see below). More precisely, rather 
than being tied closely to local results, employee-managers’ incentives relate more to 
opportunities for promotion within the firm, i.e. the opportunity to manage better/higher 
revenue hotels, or move up the Company hierarchy. This leads them to focus on company 
                                                          
2
 Management contracts are not unique to the lodging industry, however. In the U.S., they are common also, 
e.g., in the food service sector (e.g., Aramark) and in the senior/assisted living industry (e.g., Paradigm Senior 
Living). 
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rules and policies (see Bradach, 1998 for a series of case studies describing franchisee and 
employee-manager incentives and behavior in franchised chains). 
 
Franchised: The hotel is both owned and operated by a franchisee, who may be an 
individual, a partnership, or a company. After paying to the Company some upfront 
franchise fees and the percentage royalties calculated on the basis of establishment 
revenues, the franchisee is the full residual claimant on current as well as future profit – at 
least for the duration of the contract. According to Blair and Lafontaine (2005), franchise 
contracts last an average of 16 years in this industry. As a result of their claims on residual 
and future profits, franchisees are expected to put more effort into revenue generation and 
cost control at their hotel. As noted in the literature, these incentives to maximize local 
profits, however, can lead to behaviors that are detrimental to the brand, i.e., free riding. 
For this reason, franchise contracts usually include specific operations and other guidelines 
that ensure that the hotel meets the Company’s requirements. When credibly enforceable, 
these protect the Company against free-riding or local-profit-maximization behaviors that 
could damage the brand. We discuss this further below.  
 
Management Contracts: The hotel is owned by an individual or a group of investors, usually 
local to the market in which the hotel is located. These owners contract with the Company 
who then runs the hotel under one of its brands. As with company-owned and operated 
hotels, the hotel managers are employees of the Company whose personal incentives are 
linked to promotion within the firm. Moreover, under a management contract, the Company 
exercises basically the same level of control over local operations as when the hotel is 
company-owned and operated. Indeed, management contracts give control over daily 
operations to the management company (here the Company) as well as discretion over the 
amounts and types of investments required for the maintenance of the premises and the 
level of service associated with the brand. For example, a sample management contract 
states that the “Manager [i.e., the Company] shall be responsible, at the sole cost and 
expense of Lessee [i.e., the owner of the property], for keeping and maintaining the 
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Premises…”3 In exchange for its services, the Company receives contractually agreed upon 
management fees. The fees are normally a percentage of the hotel’s gross revenues, 
sometimes supplemented by guaranteed annual minimum or lump-sum payments (e.g., 
Kehoe, 1996, Contractor and Kundu, 1998). Management contracts are long term, lasting up 
to, and sometimes beyond, ten years.  
 
We argue that the ability to choose among these three organizational forms for each of their 
hotels gives firms in the global lodging industry much needed flexibility in how they respond to 
incentive issues and market characteristics, including the quality of the institutional environment. 
Specifically, as described above and summarized in Table 1, the three organizational forms differ 
along two crucial, but separate, dimensions: equity involvement and managerial/operational 
control. In particular, franchising and management contracts shift equity involvement to outside 
parties; however, management contracts and company ownership give the firm the same amount of 
managerial control, which is greater than the level of control it obtains under franchising. 
The idea that equity involvement and managerial control concerns have distinct effects on the 
choices of organizational form plays a key role in our empirical analyses below, leading us away from 
treating the organizational forms as an ordered set. We argue that institutional quality is a necessary 
condition for company ownership, and also one needed for franchising, albeit for different reasons. 
Hence, the choice between company ownership and franchising hinges on issues of incentives and 
control, whereas the choice between company ownership and management contract will depend on 
the type of expropriation concerns that have been emphasized in the literature on the effect of 
institutional quality on investment and performance.  
 
2.2 A Parsimonious Model of Organizational Form Decisions 
 
                                                          
3
 See http://contracts.onecle.com/mhi/mhi-hotels.svc.2004.shtml (08/11/2014). Conflicts over whether or not 
modifications and upkeep expenses are justified are not unheard of, especially during times of financial 
hardship (see, for example, Glater, 2009). However, the terms of the contract allow the Company to either 
sever ties or compel investment before the hotel becomes potentially harmful to the brand. 
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We present a simple model that lays out the fundamental trade-offs that firms in the lodging 
industry face, and describe the patterns we expect to find in the data as a result. Our empirical 
analyses below emphasize the decision that the Company makes for its new or newly-acquired 
hotels, so we present a model that predicts organizational choices at the time the Company opens or 
acquires a new hotel. However, assuming that the firm can change the organizational form under 
which it operates a hotel more easily than it can change hotel characteristics such as size and major 
amenities, the same model yields implications about organizational form decisions across hotels and 
years. This is useful as it allows us to rely on the full time-series dimension of our data, and thereby 
exploit data on older hotels, in some of our analyses.  
From our discussions with industry members and reading of the trade press, the typical decision 
process for new hotels can be described as follows. First, lodging firms choose the type of hotel that 
they believe will best fit a given local market. Because most global firms operate hotels under 
several brands, in different quality tiers, they also choose a brand for the new hotel. Also, to 
maintain the consistency of each of their brands in the minds of customers, they keep variation in 
hotel characteristics such as size and major amenities to a minimum within brands.4 Thus, the choice 
of brand amounts to a choice of size and amenities. Second, once the scope of the project is 
determined, or an existing hotel with the right characteristics becomes available for purchase, the 
lodging firm assesses the value of the proposed hotel under different organizational forms. The 
choice amongst these options then depends on the (proposed) hotel’s predetermined 
characteristics, among other things.5  
We formalize the above by assuming that at time t, the Company considers opening (or 
acquiring) a hotel in a given market (here country). Let 
 
represent the profits to the Company of 
operating a hotel with characteristics i (including brand) in market k using organizational form f, 
where f = (M for management contract, F for franchising, or C for Company ownership). For 
                                                          
4
 See Prasad and Dev (2000) for a discussion of lodging firms’ brand management strategies and the 
importance of delivering consistency to customers.  
5 Assuming instead that the Company chooses hotel characteristics - brand and/or size - and organizational 
form simultaneously, the estimated effects of hotel characteristics in our organizational form regressions 
might be biased. However, as long as we control for hotel characteristics in our regressions, our coefficients of 
interest (the coefficient for measures of institutional quality) will be unbiased, and can still be interpreted as a 
causal effect (see notably Stock, 2010).  
f
ik
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9 
notational convenience, time subscripts are suppressed. We write the Company’s profit under each 
organizational form as follows: 
   
   (        )   
 (  )   
 (   )   
 (        ). 
In this function, R captures the baseline profitability of a hotel, which varies as a function of local 
conditions. For simplicity of exposition, we take R to be the same function regardless of 
organizational form, and let the effects of organizational form operate through the other 
components of the profit function, as described below.  
We expect market demand, dk, to have a positive effect on the baseline profitability of the hotel, 
R. Similarly, the quality of local institutions, γk, should affect demand, possibly through its effect on 
tourism. We include γk directly in this function to make this possibility explicit. In addition, R will 
depend on hotel characteristics, xi, including notably hotel size and brand.  
We let I
f
 stand for the Company’s benefit, in terms of potential losses averted, from having 
someone else – be it a franchisee or investor – own the property. In other words, the benefit I
f
 
depends on the likelihood that, during the expected life of the assets, the local government enacts 
rules that capture, or in some other way reduce, the future returns from the investment. Issues of 
hold-up or regulatory costs are very real in the hospitality industry: the international business press 
contains many articles about sudden changes in the regulation of hotels that can have profound 
impacts on the value of operations in affected markets. For example, Leung and Wong (2009) 
mention that “In Hangzou, China, there were reports that the local authorities might impose an 
order on the Shangri-La to remove the top few stories of its hotel to meet new height restrictions.” 
Similarly, in June 2006, the United Arab Emirates’ Economic Department decreed that all hotels and 
hotel apartments were required to obtain licenses to “serve alcohol, and open bars, nightclubs and 
restaurants which show artistic programmes” (Nazzal, 2006). As such changes affect the profitability 
of the hotels, we assume that I
f
 is decreasing in the quality of local institutions, γk. However, I
C
 = 0 
since the Company assumes the risk in that case. Also, since the benefit to the Company arises from 
foreign ownership, it does not depend on whether the hotel is owned by a franchisee or an investor, 
IF(γk) = I
M(γk).  
The G
f
 component of the above profit function captures the benefit of increased local effort – 
i.e., reduced shirking – by a highly-incentivized local owner relative to a salaried Company manager. 
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By definition GC = GM = 0 since the Company relies on hired managers under both of these 
organizational forms. In other words, our focus is on effort that goes beyond the level offered by an 
employee, so the Company only benefits from higher local effort if it franchises a hotel. The benefit 
from doing so relative to hiring a manager are expected to be monotonically increasing in the cost to 
the Company of monitoring effort provision in the market where hotel i is located. We refer to 
variables that affect this cost as mik.
6  
Finally, E
f
 captures the costs of free riding by highly-incentivized local agents (franchisees). In 
other words, these reflect the damage to the Company’s reputational assets from the possibility that 
a franchisee does not abide by all company policies and damages the brand in the process. Given 
that the Company employs managers under both company ownership and management contracts, 
free riding is an issue only for franchising, i.e., EC = EM = 0. We expect free-riding costs by franchisees 
to be lower in markets with high-quality institutions, γk, because contract enforcement will be less 
costly in such environments. In addition, free-riding costs should be affected by hotel characteristics, 
xi, because, for example, negative spillover effects – damage to the brand that can arise from 
inconsistency of operations – are expected to be larger for high-end/large hotels (see Lafontaine and 
Shaw, 2005 for related evidence). Moreover, the simplicity of operations in lower-tier hotel brands 
leaves less scope for free-riding behavior. Finally, free-riding costs are expected to be increasing in 
market demand, dk, because hotel mismanagement in more prominent markets has greater 
potential reputational, and thus financial, consequences for the Company (for example, see Kalnins 
(2006, p. 207) on this issue). 
Given the decision to open a hotel with characteristics xi in market k, the firm chooses its 
organizational form by examining the upper envelope of the above profit function. Provided that this 
envelope lies above zero for at least some organizational form, the firm proceeds with the hotel and 
uses the organizational form that determines the envelope at the maximum point.7 
 
                                                          
6
 While we assume for simplicity that G is unrelated to institutional quality, what we need is that the cost of 
monitoring employees is not affected as much by institutional quality as is the cost of free riding. We believe, 
per the arguments in the text and our reading of the trade press, that this is a reasonable assumption. 
7
 See Murrell (1983) for a graphical illustration of this decision process for the case of two organizational 
forms. 
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2.3 Implications 
 
The implications of the model above for the relationship between organizational form and the 
quality of institutions are straightforward. Recalling that R is taken to be the same across 
organizational forms, the fact that IM is positive, and GM = GC = EC = EM = 0, imply that πM > πC when γk 
= 0. In other words, management contracts will be preferred to company ownership in markets with 
low-quality institutions. This prediction, however, raises an obvious question: why would outside 
investors expose themselves to owning properties that the lodging company finds too risky to own? 
The answer lies in the nature of the risks and the type of investors involved. The investors – be they 
equity owners or franchisees – are usually local business people who are better able to evaluate and 
manage risks locally by virtue of their knowledge of the local market as well as potential personal 
connections to the local business community and the government.8 For example, on May 26, 2009, 
Marriott signed an agreement to manage a luxury hotel property owned by Emirates Airline and 
Group, the largest aviation and travel services provider in the Middle East. The chief executive of 
Emirates Airline and Group at the time was His Highness Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al-Maktoum, a 
member of the United Arab Emirates royal family (Travelwires, 2009). Similarly, franchisees are 
typically local business people well versed in the characteristics of their local markets and tied to the 
local community. In that sense, both management and franchise contracts represent solutions to the 
potential expropriation problem where risk is reduced due to the local market knowledge of the 
investor, and the remaining risk gets allocated to parties (investors or franchisees) that are in a 
better position to manage it. 
The model, however, also makes clear that franchising will not necessarily be the preferred form 
of organization in markets with low quality institutions. Because IF = IM for all values of γk, the 
comparison of management and franchise contracts will always hinge on the relationship between 
GF and EF. Per our assumptions, free-riding costs, EF, are largest at γk = 0 while G
F is independent of 
                                                          
8
 As Henisz (2000) notes, similar rationales exist for foreign manufacturers seeking local partners. 
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γk. Thus G
F - EF is smallest when γk is low, making management contracts preferable also to 
franchising when the quality of institutions is low.9 
The above conclusions provide the most important implications that we take to data below, 
namely that the desirability of management contracts – which have the advantages of low equity 
investment for the Company but also a high degree of control – will be high in those markets 
characterized by poor institutional quality.  
There is strong anecdotal evidence from the hotel industry to support this particular prediction. 
For example, in 2008, Marriott announced its plans to increase the number of its Middle Eastern 
properties from 26 to 65 by partnering with prominent local investors who will build and own hotels 
that the company will run under management contracts.10 Given that measures of the quality of 
institutions in many of the region’s countries tend to be low, Marriott’s decision to rely on 
management contracts to grow its presence in these markets is consistent with our model’s 
prediction. Similarly, Accor’s 2005 Annual Report indicates that growth in emerging markets will 
mostly take place via management contracts and other joint ventures with local businesses.11 Along 
similar lines, IHG’s 2009 Annual Report emphasizes the importance of its intellectual property, as 
captured in the reputations of its brands, and notes that this is imperiled if the Group’s ability to 
enforce contracts is in doubt in a market or if changes in legislation hurt their ability to monetize 
their investments.12 
The model’s implications for the relationship between institutional quality and the choice 
between franchising and company ownership are less straightforward. Ignoring hotel subscripts for 
simplicity, and differentiating each organizational form’s profit equation with respect to institutional 
quality, we can write: 
                                                          
9
 Note that in our model, (R + I + G – E) would always be greater than R+ I if G – E were always positive. This 
would imply that franchising would always dominate management contracts, an implication that is 
contradicted by the data. Hence in our simple formulation where R is independent of contract type, we need 
to assume that G-E can be negative for low enough values of k. 
10
 Webwire (2008). 
11
 Accor, 2005 Annual Report, p. 70. 
12
 InterContinental Hotel Group (IHG), 2009 Annual Report, p. 32-33. 
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
13 
   
 
   
 
  
   
 
   
 
   
 
  
   
 
  
   
 
   
 
   
 
since       ⁄  is negative, and 
   
 
   
 
  
   
 
  
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
   
 
 
since        ⁄ is also negative. These inequalities imply that better institutions will lead to an 
increased use of company ownership relative to management contracts, and also lead the Company 
to want more franchising. However, in contexts where institutional quality is high, the decision to 
operate a hotel corporately or to franchise it will hinge on how       ⁄  compares to    
    ⁄ , and 
on the levels of IF, GF and EF. It is straightforward to construct examples where, for a given hotel in a 
given market, the Company switches from management contract to franchising and then to 
company ownership as the quality of institutions goes up, and other examples where it goes from M 
to C to F.13  
What the model thus makes clear is that other factors besides institutional quality, notably 
factors that affect the level of monitoring and free-riding costs at a hotel, will come into play in the 
decision to turn towards franchising or company ownership for a particular hotel in those countries 
where institutions are higher quality. For example, if the cost of monitoring hired manager effort is 
low for a given hotel in a particular market, which implies that the benefit of high-powered 
incentives is low (low GF), and there are significant returns to preventing free riding (high EF), the 
firm will be more likely to turn to company ownership than franchising for that hotel in that market.  
3. Data and Methodology 
 
                                                          
13
 In yet other cases, it can easily go from M to C, and never use F, or go from M to F without using C. 
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We test the predictions above using proprietary data from a large, multi-brand multinational hotel 
firm. As mentioned previously, a confidentiality agreement prohibits us from disclosing the name of 
the company and characteristics that might identify it. The data, which are at the hotel-year level, 
include information about organizational form, physical characteristics (i.e., size and location), and 
brand affiliation for all the Company’s hotels between 1999 and 2003.  
The Company operates almost as many hotels in its domestic market as it does internationally. 
We exclude the Company’s domestic hotels from our analyses because we are concerned that the 
Company might pursue different strategies at home and abroad. More importantly, the Company 
makes almost no usage of management contracts in its domestic market, relying instead almost 
exclusively on franchising and company ownership. Since the domestic market is one that is 
characterized by high-quality institutions per our measures, including the large number of domestic 
hotels in our analyses would all but guarantee that we would obtain results consistent with our 
predictions. Thus, we pursue a more conservative approach and explore whether the pattern of 
organizational form decisions that the Company makes in the international arena conforms to our 
model’s predictions. 
Our data set includes information for 1,493 hotels in 100 countries, and a total of 5,584 hotel-
years.14 The presence of the Company in most countries around the world confirms that large 
multinational lodging firms operate hotels even in those countries where institutional quality is quite 
low. The Company, however, has only a few hotels per country: we have 56 hotel-year observations 
per country on average, but a median of only 11. The Company also operates its international hotels 
under 20 different brands and sub-brands. Interestingly, a large proportion of the Company’s hotels 
in emerging markets are high-end brands – and thus also larger hotels. For example, the hotel-
weighted average value of GDP per capita in 2003 for the countries where the Company has 
established hotels under its best-known luxury brand is about $12,000, while it is more than $19,000 
for its best-known budget brands. Finally, the small number of observations per country, and the 
variety of brands that the Company relies on, imply that business stealing is not a major issue in 
                                                          
14
 As will be clear below, we have a complete set of variables on a smaller number of countries because some 
of the countries are not covered in sources of international economic data. These tend to be quasi-
autonomous islands with something resembling colonial status. We discuss our final samples further below. 
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deciding where to establish hotels for the Company. This was confirmed in our discussions with 
Company managers.  
 
3.1 Sample Definitions 
 
Table 2 shows that changes in organizational forms over time are quite infrequent: we observe such 
changes for only 2.9 percent (or 21+1+68+15+3+5=113) of the 3,945 pairs of successive years for a 
hotel in our data. This low frequency suggests either that the Company has not had much need to 
change the organizational form under which its hotels operate, or that it is costly to make such 
changes.  
If organizational form decisions are indeed sticky, as one might expect given the long-term 
nature of these contracts, exploiting the time-series dimension of our data may be problematic. For 
this reason, in what follows, we focus first on the Company’s new hotels and analyze the 
organizational form decisions made at the time of opening (or acquisition). Given the low frequency 
of organizational form changes in our data, we assume that the organizational form we observe 
when a hotel is first included in our data is the organizational form upon entry if the first observation 
is within two calendar years of opening (or acquisition). After eliminating hotels for which we do not 
have all the variables for our baseline regressions, as described below, we are left with 712 hotels 
located in 64 different countries on six different continents for what we refer to as our “new hotel 
sample.” 15 The median number of new hotels per country is 3.5, though the mean is 11. The new 
hotels operate under 16 different brands covering low, medium, and high quality segments. As with 
countries, observations are not evenly distributed across brands: the mean number of new hotels 
per brand is 44.5 while the median is 31.  
While the lack of changes in organizational forms in the period of our data suggests that we 
should treat all observations for a hotel as a single observation as described above, it is also true that 
                                                          
15
 Our results are not sensitive to including only hotels that we observe in their first year and hence for which 
we can confirm their organizational form at that time. However, including hotels that we observe within 2 
years of opening or acquisition by the Company allows us to retain a larger sample and hence use more of the 
information we have. 
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firms in the hotel industry sometimes buy back franchised or managed properties to operate as their 
own, and, at other times, they franchise or sell to new owners hotels that were company-owned and 
so on. Thus the lack of changes in the year-to-year data in Table 2 may reflect the fact that the 
Company has not needed to change organizational forms over the period of our data. In that case, it 
would be appropriate to rely on all the information in our panel data set, including observations over 
time for specific hotels, as well as data on older hotels. The latter are excluded from the new hotel 
sample as we cannot infer the original organizational form for them. Insofar as there was a general 
trend towards democratization during our sample period (several years after the fall of the Berlin 
wall), this means that stickiness in contractual form will lead to attenuated estimates of the 
relationship between the quality of institutions and organizational form. Thus, our approach of 
comparing the results of the analyses on our new hotel sample with those of our full sample serves 
as a conservative robustness check. 
 
3.2 Measurement and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Given the decision to open a hotel with characteristics xi in market k, we analyze the likelihood that 
the hotel is franchised or company-owned or operated via management contract. We proxy for our 
main independent variable of interest, namely institutional quality (γk) in a country, using the Checks 
index from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Keefer and Stasavage, 2003). 
This variable has been used as a proxy for the quality of governance (Keefer and Knack, 2007), state 
stability (Arezki and Bruckner, 2011), and as a measure of political fragmentation impacting tax 
policy (Da Rin et al., 2011). The DPI Checks index is calculated using the weighted number of veto 
players in a political system, where the weights are allocated based on an analysis of electoral 
competitiveness, electoral rules, economic policy orientation and party affiliation.16 Higher scores 
indicate increased institutional stability. We believe that this measure is a good proxy for the 
Company’s view of the overall quality of the institutional environment insofar as political stability 
allows it to make more confident long-run predictions about the policy environment. In addition, we 
use the World Bank’s “Voice and Accountability” Indicator, which, among the six World Bank 
                                                          
16
 Details on the construction of the index can be found in Beck et al. (2001) and Keefer and Stasavage (2003). 
The Database of Political Institutions is available at: http://go.worldbank.org/2EAGGLRZ40.  
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Worldwide Governance Indicators, is most directly interpretable as an indicator of democratic 
institutions.17  
In some specifications, we include additional control variables to account for some of the factors 
highlighted in the literature and in our theoretical framework. Specifically, we use the “Control of 
Corruption” and the “Rule of Law” measures from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators to capture the risk of expropriation and the extent of enforcement of arms-length 
contracts respectively.18  
Consistent with the empirical contracting and trade literatures (e.g., Brickley and Dark, 1987, 
Rose, 2004, Lafontaine and Slade, 2007), we rely on the physical distance of the hotel from the 
Company’s headquarters to capture monitoring costs, mik. We use the log of the geographic distance 
(in kilometers, based on the “great circle” method) between the city where the Company is 
headquartered and the center of the city in which the hotel is located as our measure of physical 
distance. In addition to affecting monitoring costs, physical distance may reduce concerns over free-
riding costs as further away markets may be less important to the Company from a reputation point 
of view. Such a reduction in concern over the potential for reputational damage also could manifest 
itself in the form of increased reliance on franchising in these markets, as the costs of franchising 
free-riding would be lower from the Company’s perspective. This potential effect would thus be 
indistinguishable empirically from the potential effect of high monitoring costs: under both 
interpretations, the implication would be an increased reliance on franchising. Finally, physical 
distance might affect the cost of relying on courts to enforce certain types of contract terms. This 
                                                          
17
 The six indicators represent the views of a large number of respondents regarding the following dimensions 
of governance: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. For more on these, see 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. The Voice and Accountability Indicator is meant to 
capture the extent to which “a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.” Because these were released every other 
year for our sample period, we interpolate the missing values. 
18
 The Rule of Law measure is defined as follows, “captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of  crime and violence.” The Control of Corruption 
variable “captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests.” 
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could affect the desirability of franchising in further away markets as well, although this effect would 
reduce the Company’s desire to franchise. 
We expect monitoring to be more costly in distant markets, but given distance, less costly in 
those countries where the firm has a greater presence already by the time the new hotel is opened 
because the fixed cost of traveling to the market in question – to review hotel performance and/or 
the extent to which operations adhere to Company policies – can be spread across a larger number 
of hotels. Consequently, we include the total number of hotels affiliated with the Company, across 
all brands, in the same city as hotel i as an additional measure of monitoring costs.19 
As mentioned earlier, the potential for reputational loss due to free riding may be greater for 
larger hotels. We therefore include hotel size, namely the (log of the) number of rooms in the hotel, 
among hotel characteristics (xi). We also include year fixed effects, as well as brand/continent 
dummy variables in all our regressions. The latter in particular control for the possibility that the 
Company, for example, may have local monitoring headquarters in some regions, or may pursue 
different policies (i.e., brand mix) across continents that may also affect organizational form 
decisions within brands/continents.20 
We use three different variables to proxy for market size (dk), starting with the (log of) real per 
capita GDP and the (log of) country population, both taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. In addition, given that the demand for hotel services is linked not only to 
demand from residents but also from tourists and convention attendees, we use the (log of) real 
tourism receipts from inbound international tourists, which we obtained from the World Tourism 
Organization.21 Like GDP per capita, the latter may also be positively associated with the quality of 
local institutions, in which case controlling for these directly in our regressions addresses a potential 
source of omitted variable bias.  
                                                          
19
 See also Kosová, Lafontaine and Perrigot (2013) on this approach to measuring monitoring costs. 
20
 Specifically, we identify the Company’s six major international brands, grouping all others into a seventh 
category. We then interact these brand dummy variables with six continent dummy variables, one for each of 
Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North America and South America. 
21
 See http://www.unwto.org/facts/menu.html.  
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Finally, motivated by discussions in the investor reports of international lodging firms about 
economic as well as political stability affecting investment decisions, we include the standard 
deviation of each country’s GDP growth rate for a rolling five-year window in all our regressions. 
Specifically, the value of this variable for a given country in a given year is the standard deviation of 
that country’s GDP growth over the current and four preceding years, where data on GDP growth 
are from the World Bank. As with some of our other variables, controlling for economic volatility also 
ensures that our coefficient on institutional quality captures the impact of this variable separately 
from that of economic volatility.  
Summary statistics for all the variables above – except the indicator variables – for both our new 
hotel and overall samples are shown in the top and bottom panels of Table 3, respectively. A 
comparison of the two panels suggests that the Company continues to open new hotels in countries 
whose characteristics are similar to those it already operates in. Because our observations are at the 
hotel level, in this table the averages for country characteristics such as the DPI Checks index and the 
World Bank’s Governance Indicators give more weight to countries with more hotel observations. 
Using our whole sample, with country/year level data, such that countries are all given the same 
weight, yields a lower average DPI Checks index of 3.15 and a per capita GDP of 9,533. This confirms 
that the Company has established more hotels in those countries with higher DPI, as our model 
implies it would. There are of course countries around the world where the Company is not present. 
Consistent with our model’s prediction, the average DPI Checks index in these is even lower, at 2.55 
on average during the period of our data.22 
Our main interest lies in exploring the relationship between the Company’s choice of 
organizational form for its new hotels and the quality of local institutions. We describe this 
relationship on the left-hand side of Table 4, for the new hotel sample in the top, and the whole 
sample in the bottom panel. Specifically, we show the distribution of organizational forms for 
countries with low, medium, and high levels of institutional quality conditional on the Company 
being present in a country, as captured again by the DPI Checks index. In Table 4, we choose cutoffs 
that generate similar size groups to the extent possible given the lumpiness of the index. 
                                                          
22
 This average also is calculated by giving the same weight to each country. The lower average value of the 
index for countries where the firm has no hotel implies the Company estimates that such hotels would 
generate negative profits across all organizational forms, so a no entry decision is indeed associated with low 
values of γk.  
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Results in Table 4 confirm what was apparent already in Table 2, namely, that the Company 
operates most of its hotels, including almost half of its new hotels, under company ownership. 
However, the left-hand side of the table also reveals substantial heterogeneity in the usage of 
different contractual forms across the DPI Checks groups. Some of this variation fits the qualitative 
predictions of our simple model. For example, consider the Company’s utilization of franchising. The 
Table shows that in countries with low scores of 1 to 3 in the DPI Checks Iindex, which include Ivory 
Coast, Ghana, and Morocco, very few hotels are franchised. However, for countries with a Checks 
score of 4, which at the time of our data included Argentina, Peru, and South Korea, the proportion 
of franchised hotels is much higher. For our new hotel sample, the proportion is higher still in 
countries with scores of five or more, which include Australia, the Netherlands, and New Zealand (in 
most years). It falls slightly in our overall sample. Overall, the data patterns strongly suggest that 
franchising is not the organizational form that the Company turns to in markets with low-quality 
institutions, contrary to predictions from some models in the literature (e.g., Contractor and Kundu, 
1998, Chen and Dimou, 2005).   
The descriptive patterns on the left-hand side of Table 4, however, do not completely support 
our simple model. For example, the reliance on management contracts does not go down 
systematically as the quality of institutions increases. Of course, other factors can affect these 
patterns. For example, the Company’s luxury brands are disproportionately represented in countries 
with lower Checks scores, and luxury brands are expected to be operated under organizational 
forms that give the Company more control, i.e., company ownership or management contracts. 
Similarly, the right-hand side of Table 4 shows how the distribution of organizational forms across 
countries classified by per-capita GDP appears highly non-random. Conspicuously, we find that 
management contracts are overwhelmingly preferred in the countries with low GDP per capita, in 
both the new hotel and overall sample, and that the reliance on management contracts is much 
lower in higher GDP per capita countries. These data patterns suggest a strong relationship between 
organizational form and the level of economic development (per capita GDP), confirming the need to 
control for per capita GDP and other country characteristics, in assessing the role of institutions in 
our analyses below.  
While Table 4 indicates that different organizational forms are used non-randomly around the 
world, it does not address the reasonable question of whether country-level factors perfectly 
determine these choices. If that were true, then the appropriate unit of observation would be the 
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country rather than the hotel. However, examining the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) obtained 
from organizational form shares in each country – i.e., calculating the sum of squared shares of each 
organizational form as a percentage of all hotels in each country – we find an average of 8,596 
across the countries where the Company operates hotels. Weighing countries by the number of 
hotels in each country leads to a lower, but still high, average HHI of 7,521. These values imply that 
country-level factors are certainly strongly correlated with the choice of organizational form, 
but they do not fully determine it. Moreover, the reduction in the average as we weigh by the 
intensity of the Company’s operations indicates that where the Company has more hotels, it 
more frequently exploits flexibility in organizational form to address hotel-specific issues. 
We view this as evidence that it is appropriate to focus on empirical strategies that account 
for hotel-level variation in factors like size and branding, as we do below. 
 
3.3 Empirical Model  
 
The few papers that have examined organizational form decisions in the lodging industry have relied 
on ordered-response models (e.g., Contractor and Kundu, 1998, Chen and Dimou, 2005). These 
models assume the existence of a single unobserved index along which the organizational forms can 
be ranked. Estimated cutoff values for the index then indicate the predicted choice of organizational 
form along the continuum. We believe that this approach is problematic because underlying factors 
for organizational form decisions in this industry in our view cannot be reduced to a single 
dimension. This was illustrated in Table 1, where we showed that organizational forms differ along 
the two key dimensions of equity and control. Consequently, in our analyses below, we rely on non-
ordered discrete choice models. 
Our choice of specification is the multinomial logit (MNL) model. This model has many attractive 
features, not least of which is its analytical tractability. Its main drawback is that it imposes the 
stringent condition that the pair-wise conditional probabilities should not be influenced by the 
presence of other options. We conducted a series of Hausman tests and found that in our data, the 
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independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption could not be rejected.23 Because of concern 
about the power of Hausman tests, we also estimated less restrictive nested logit models. We found 
that none of the inclusive values were statistically different from one, implying that the best nested 
model was not statistically different from the MNL model. Furthermore, our nested logit estimates 
were very similar to the MNL estimates. Given all this, we follow Train (2003, p. 40) in thinking of the 
MNL model as a good approximation to the true choice process.  
The MNL specification is straightforwardly derived from the model in Section 2.4. Adding error 
terms that are independently and identically drawn from type 1 extreme value distributions to the 
profit functions associated with each of the three organizational forms, where the error terms 
capture unobserved factors that might lead the Company to prefer one organizational form over the 
others, and assuming that the profit functions are linear in the explanatory variables, X, the 
probability of observing a given organizational form f is: 
 
for j = C, M, F. Because there are multiple sets of β(f) that lead to the same probabilities, the model is 
identified by arbitrarily setting β(f) to 0 for one f. Consistent with our model above, and the fact that 
it is the most popular organizational form in the data, we set the default case to be company 
ownership. This means that we are modeling the effect of variables on the probability that a new 
hotel i in country k is operated under organizational form f, where f is either franchising or a 
management contract, relative to company ownership. Separating X into the factors identified 
above, and suppressing time subscripts, we have: 
  (
  ( )
  (            )
)
  
   (        )   
 (  )   
 (   )   
 (        )       
    
     
 
 
   
      
       
      
         
                                                          
23
 We conducted these tests with regression models that excluded some dummy variables (brand/continent 
and/or year dummy variables). When all these were included, the Hausman tests suffered from the well-
known finite-sample problem of failing to return non-negative test-statistics (Small and Hsiao, 1985, 
Wooldridge, 2002).  
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where εik represents an idiosyncratic shock, the   
 
are year fixed effects, and the    
  capture the 
possible effects of brands – which we allow to be different across continents – on organizational 
form decisions. In all our regressions, we also control for possible correlations in the choice of 
organizational forms across hotels in a country by clustering standard errors at the country level.  
4. Regression Results 
 
4.1 Baseline Results 
 
We show results for the new hotel sample in Table 5. Each model in this table is represented by a 
pair of columns, with the first showing the effect of a variable on the likelihood that a new hotel is 
organized under a management contract rather than company ownership while the second column 
shows the effect on the relative probability of franchising compared to company ownership. In the 
first set of two columns, we use the DPI Checks variable as our measure of institutional quality. In 
the second, we use the log of the same index. In the third pair of columns, we rely on the World 
Bank Voice and Accountability index as our main measure of interest. 
As noted above, we include brand-continent dummy variables, which account for the possibility 
that the Company behaves differently with certain of its brands, and that this may be different in 
different regions. We also include year fixed effects, which capture potential changes in the 
macroeconomic conditions faced by the Company. χ2 tests that the coefficients of these two sets of 
dummy variables are all equal to zero are rejected in all regressions.  
We measure the goodness of fit using the share of correctly predicted outcomes, where the 
predicted outcome for each hotel is the organizational form with the highest predicted probability. 
The models all correctly predict 83-84 percent of the organizational form choices, much above the 
47.9 percent that we would achieve if we predicted the most frequent outcome in the data, namely 
company ownership, for all observations (see Table 4, first row, 4th column).  
To assess the validity of our empirical approach, we also estimated analogous specifications 
under the assumption that the organizational forms are ordered. These models only correctly 
predict 73% of the observed outcomes. Consistent with the dramatic improvement in model fit, 
likelihood ratio tests further confirmed that the multinomial models perform statistically significantly 
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better than ordered models do. We conclude that, consistent with our theoretical framework, 
institutional and market-level factors indeed affect different contractual choices in different ways.  
To facilitate the interpretation of the results in Table 5, Table 6 shows the average effect of a 
one standard deviation increase in each of the independent variables on the probability that each 
organizational form is chosen. As suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p. 122-123) and Greene 
(2003, p. 668), we approximate the effect of a change in an independent variable using the average 
effect of such a change across all observations, rather than the effect at mean values of all variables.  
The results in Tables 5 and 6 strongly support our model’s prediction that an increase in 
institutional quality should lead to a decrease in the likelihood of choosing a management contract. 
Moreover, the impact is economically important: for example, a one standard deviation increase in 
the DPI Checks index is associated with a 6.9 percentage point decrease in the likelihood that a new 
hotel is opened under a management contract. Using the log of the same index, we find an even 
greater reduction, at 8.1 percentage points. Finally, using the Voice and Accountability Indicator, the 
effect of a one standard deviation is greater still, at 14.5 percentage points. 
To ensure that our conclusions about the role of institutional quality in affecting organizational 
form decisions are robust, we re-estimated our baseline models with the Control of Corruption and 
Rule of Law measures. The estimates for these models are shown in Table 7 while the economic 
magnitudes of effects (as measured by the average predicted response of a one standard deviation 
change) are shown in Table 8. Not only are the results relating our measures of institutional quality 
robust to including these new variables, but consistent with our theoretical framework, we find a 
marked reduction in the use of company ownership as the Rule of Law index, i.e., as the 
enforceability of contracts and property rights increases. Similarly, as the index of Control of 
Corruption increases, such that investments are at lower risk of expropriation, we find significant 
increases in the likelihood of company ownership and reduced usage of both franchising and 
management contracts.  
Most importantly, even with these additional measures of institutions in our regressions, the 
effects of our baseline measures of institutional quality on the Company’s organizational form 
decisions remain economically and statistically significant. We conclude that the general stability of 
the policy environment constitutes an additional factor relevant to the Company, in addition to 
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factors representing the current environment, i.e., the current likelihood of expropriation or current 
enforceability of contract.  
Turning to the other variables in our empirical model, we find that in both Tables 6 and 8, the 
Company relies less on management contracts in those countries with higher levels of tourism, 
another potential measure of the quality of institutions. However, controlling for other factors, it 
uses them more in higher income countries, contrary to the descriptive data in Table 4. Increased 
local presence has a statistically significant, but small effect on organizational form decisions. Based 
on monitoring cost arguments, we expect to find fewer franchised hotels in markets where the 
Company has greater local presence. And indeed this is the case.24 Similarly, free-riding concerns 
suggest that the Company would not rely on franchising as much for its larger hotels, which is what 
we observe. Other variables have comparatively small effects on these decisions. Most importantly 
from our perspective, since, for example, tourism, income and economic volatility are all likely to be 
related to the quality of institutions, the fact that we still find a significant effect for our measures of 
institutional quality once we control for all these is reassuring.  
Interestingly, one result that is very robust in our regressions but runs contrary to our initial 
hypotheses is that hotels that are more distant from the Company’s headquarters – relative to other 
same brand hotels on the same continent – are much more likely to be operated under management 
contract. As distance might be expected to increase the cost of monitoring employed managers, 
agency arguments would suggest that these distant establishments should be franchised.25 Yet we 
find strong evidence that the Company prefers to retain control, while still not taking ownership, in 
distant markets. One explanation for this, mentioned above, might be that distance also increases 
the cost of disciplining the potential free-riding behavior of franchisees, thereby making franchising 
less desirable in such markets. In addition, distant hotels may serve an important purpose for the 
                                                          
24
 There is also a literature suggesting that increased experience leads firms to take on greater risks than they 
otherwise would (e.g., Delios and Henisz, 2003). Our result, that the firm chooses to own and operate hotels to 
a greater extent, rather than franchise them, when it already operates more hotels locally can be interpreted 
to mean that increased experience leads to greater risk taking in the form of more company ownership (and 
less franchising in this case). See also footnote 29 on the effect of including hotel age in our panel analyses, 
which again can be interpreted in terms of experience. 
25
 The fact that the markets are far away also might make the firm care less about control, as mentioned in our 
discussion section. This would reinforce the prediction that these establishments should be franchised. 
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Company that our model does not capture. For example, in distant locations, a given hotel might be 
a flagship property for the Company and its brands, in which case control becomes a major concern 
for the Company. Or it might be more difficult to find franchisees in the types of distant markets 
where the Company operates.  
In their study of contracting by lodging firms, Contractor and Kundu (1998) distinguished among 
four types of contractual relationships, which they ordered from most to least company involvement 
as follows: first, company ownership; then, partial ownership; next, management contracts; and 
lastly, franchising. Chen and Dimou (2005) do not have a partial ownership category, but order the 
remaining organizational forms in the same way. Both papers find a statistically significant negative 
relationship between company involvement and country risk, implying that franchising should be the 
dominant organizational form in the riskiest countries. In contrast, allowing more flexibility in 
addressing issues of control and equity, our results indicate that the Company eschews ownership in 
the countries with low-quality institutions and low tourism demand, per the literature, but it also 
chooses to retain control in those markets – i.e., it relies more on management contracts rather than 
increasing its use of franchising.  
 
4.2 Identification and Robustness 
 
Establishing causality in cross-country settings such as the one here is always challenging (see, e.g., 
Rajan and Zingales, 1998, Commander and Svejnar, 2011). Besides choosing a within-firm design, 
which holds constant company policies and other firm-level attributes, our primary approach to 
identification is to control for as many observable differences across countries and hotels as 
possible, including brand/continent and year fixed effects. As described above, we also account 
explicitly for differences in levels of economic development (per capita GDP) as well as economic 
volatility (i.e., the standard deviation of GDP growth), tourism expenditures, and specific measures 
of contract enforceability and expropriation risk. 
In this section, we provide further evidence for the results above, this time using our overall 
sample. As noted in Section 3.1, the regressions focusing on the organizational form decisions at the 
time the hotel becomes part of the Company will be consistent even if organizational forms are 
sticky. However, if the Company can modify organizational form decisions relatively easily, the 
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results from the new hotel subsample will be less efficient, due to the smaller sample size, than 
those estimated on the overall sample. For this reason, in Table 9, we show results for the same 
models as in Table 7, but for our overall sample.  
Consistent with what we would expect if contracts are sticky, the results for our main variable of 
interest are again all statistically significant, and very consistent with those from the new hotel 
sample. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in the DPI index leads to a 4.5 percentage 
point decrease in the likelihood that a property is operated under a management contract. With the 
log of the same index, there is a 6.3 percentage point reduction, whereas with the Voice and 
Accountability index, the effect is again much larger, at 18.4 percentage points. In addition, the 
effects of other variables – e.g., distance, tourism expenditures, local presence – are also broadly 
consistent with those we found using our new hotel sample.  
We also estimated a number of other specifications, using different functional forms for our 
main measure of quality of institutions, the DPI Checks index, as well as alternative measures of 
institutional quality, namely an index of Political Stability also produced by the World Bank, as well 
as the Political Constraint index, which is similar to the DPI Checks index insofar as it is explicitly 
intended to capture the stability of the policy environment.26 We present the coefficients for the 
measure of institutional quality for our new hotel sample for these alternative models in Table A1 in 
the Appendix. We also tested the robustness of our main results to using a smaller sample of new 
hotels, namely only those that are opened from 1999 onward, such that we observe the 
organizational form upon entry (recall our sample above allows a delay of two years). The results for 
the main variable of interests were even stronger for this smaller set of new hotels. Finally, we 
tested the robustness of our results to the inclusion of further control variables, 27 or the exclusion 
                                                          
26
 The Political Constraint Index was developed by Witold Henisz. It is available at http://www-
management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/. The World Bank Governance Indicators are available at: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.  
27
 To further test the robustness of our results, we also ran specifications involving a measure of education  
and controlling for cultural differences using a language control variable as in Holburn and Zelner (2010). 
Adding either of our two measures of education – years of compulsory education or percent of labor force 
with at least a secondary education level, both from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, did not 
alter our qualitative results. As their introduction reduced our sample size, and their effect was mostly not 
significant, we choose to focus on specifications without education in the body of the paper. The addition of a 
language dummy variable also did not affect our main results, although we found that it had a statistically 
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from the sample of hotels in three countries where government policies could have made ownership 
particularly difficult.28 In all cases, we found that improvements in institutional quality led to similar 
reductions in the probability of using a management contract as in our main results above.  
 
4.3 Changes in Institutional Quality and Organizational Form Decisions 
 
As a final assessment of the causal interpretation of our results regarding our main variable of 
interest, in this section we focus on the Company’s behavior in countries that have experienced 
important changes in institutional quality, as proxied by changes in the DPI Checks Index during the 
sample period. Given the relatively low frequency of such changes, we cannot draw strong 
conclusions from these analyses, but we view them as lending further support for our results. 
We observe seventeen cases in which a country’s DPI Checks Index score changed by two or 
more, a level of change that we believe is likely to reflect a real change in the quality of institutions 
in the countries. Of these, there are seven cases where the index went down, and ten where it 
increased.  
Our model suggests that decreases in the quality of institutions should make expansion less 
attractive (or closings more likely), but that conditional on a new hotel opening, the Company should 
be more likely to rely on a management contract. What we find is that in one case of DPI reduction, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
significant effect on organizational form choices. Finally, because the above sample includes a number of older 
hotels, we also estimated the regressions in Table 9 with an additional variable, namely the (log of) hotel age. 
We found that this variable had a statistically significant effect on organizational form decisions, being 
associated with the Company moving away from management contracts and franchising towards more 
company ownership. However, the effects were not large, and results for other variables were unaffected, 
leading us to focus on the (larger sample) results in the tables and discussion above. Details on all these – and 
other robustness models – are available from the authors upon request.  
28
 These include China and Vietnam and some other jurisdictions. Among other specifications, we also 
estimated our model with an interaction term between hotel size and our measure of institutional quality to 
capture the possibility that, in those markets where institutions are problematic, free riding might be more 
costly the larger the hotel is. The coefficient of this interaction term, however, was not statistically significant, 
and we could not reject the null hypothesis that a simpler model with just the main effects performed as well.  
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the Company closed its only hotel in the market. In four other cases, the Company changed neither 
the number of hotels in the country, nor its relative usage of the different organizational forms, 
suggesting again some degree of stickiness in these decisions. In the two remaining cases, the 
Company opened hotels. In one country, it opened a new hotel under a management contract. In 
the other, a country where the Company already had a substantial presence, all under management 
contracts, it added a new hotel under a management contract, as well as a new franchised hotel, in 
the year of the DPI index decrease. The year after the change in the DPI index, it added yet another 
hotel, again under management contract. 
Of the ten instances where the country’s DPI Checks score increased by two or more, there are 
three cases where the Company did nothing. When it made changes, it again changed its operations 
in a way broadly consistent with our model’s predictions. Specifically, in four of the remaining seven 
countries, the Company expanded the scope of its operations. In three of these four cases, it did so 
by opening a company-owned hotel. In the fourth case, the Company increased its number of 
management contracts from none to two. In two of the remaining three cases, it reduced its total 
number of hotels. In one case, where it operated only a few franchised hotels, it exited the country 
completely, suggesting that it simply sold its operations there. In another, it reduced its stock of 
company-owned hotels from two to one, and made no change to its stock of three management 
contract hotels and zero franchises. Finally, in the last country, the Company switched from having a 
lone hotel under a management contract to a single hotel under a franchise contract. 
 While these patterns are mostly anecdotal, given that they do not account for the many other 
possible events that may have accompanied the change in institutional quality, we nevertheless 
draw some reassurance from their broad consistency with the predictions of our model and results 
of our empirical analyses.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Using proprietary data from a large multinational, multi-brand lodging firm, we examined the effect 
of differences in institutional quality across countries – principally captured by the World Bank’s DPI 
Checks Index – on the way in which the Company chooses to organize its operations locally. We 
showed that the Company is less likely to choose to be sole owner and residual claimant when a 
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hotel is in a country with low institutional quality, where the “rules of the game” can be changed 
more easily. This is consistent with the idea that markets where institutions such as property rights 
protections are weak increase the risks attached to company ownership and investment, as Henisz 
(2000), Javorcik (2004), Branstetter et al. (2006), and Laeven and Woodruff (2007) have 
documented. Conditional on having decided to do business in these markets, the Company typically 
chooses to partner with local investors who, often because of what they know and who they are, 
including their connection to the business and political communities in the local market, and their 
knowledge of the same, can mitigate the risks associated with unexpected policy or regulatory 
changes. The data indicate that although both options afford it the opportunity to have no equity in 
the hotel, in markets with less stable institutions, the Company prefers to maintain operational 
control through the use of management contracts rather than relying on franchising. We argue that 
this occurs because franchisee free riding is harder to detect and/or punish in environments 
characterized by unstable regulatory regimes. This, in turn, makes franchising less appealing in such 
contexts. 
Overall, our results show that the Company’s organizational form decisions vary significantly 
depending on the characteristics of the market in which a hotel is located, and that institutional 
quality is one of the factors affecting these decisions. Our findings thus suggest that regulatory 
considerations can affect the behavior of firms in the service sector in ways that are similar – but not 
identical – to effects found in the literature, a literature whose focus to date has been almost 
exclusively on firms in manufacturing and high-tech industries. Our hope is that future work will 
consider how this effect might vary across retail and service industries, as well as how other 
organizational decisions – beside the choice among the three organizational forms used in the 
lodging industry – might be relied upon by firms in other sectors to deal with similar issues. 
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Table 1: Company Control and Equity Involvement Under Different Organizational Forms.  
 
 
 
    Direct Control Over Operations: 
    No Yes 
Equity Involvement: 
 
No F M 
Yes  C 
Note: `C' indicates company ownership; `M', management contract, and `F' franchising. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Organizational Form Changes from One Period to the Next.  
 
   Current:   
 
  
Company-
Owned  
Management 
Contract  Franchised  Total  
Previous: 
Company  2,275 21 1 2,297 
Owned 99.04% 0.91% 0.04% 100.0% 
Management  68 1,228 15 1,311 
Contract 5.19% 93.67% 1.14% 100.0% 
Franchised  3 5 329 337 
 0.89% 1.48% 97.63% 100.0% 
 Total  2,346 1,254 345 3,945 
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   59.47% 31.79% 8.75% 100.0% 
Note: Number of hotel-year observations with percentage of row total in italics.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics. 
 
a) New Hotel Sample 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DPI Checks 706 3.68 1.22 1 7 
World Bank Voice Indicator 711 0.86 0.80 -1.63 1.75 
Control of Corruption 711 1.27 1.03 -1.14 2.43 
Rule of Law 711 0.91 0.90 -1.45 1.95 
Real GDP per capita ($K) 712 15.08 10.54 0.22 48.64 
Log (real GDP per capita) 712 9.16 1.15 5.41 10.79 
Std. Dev. (GDP – 5 years) 712 1.71 1.61 0.41 8.80 
Country Population (Ms) 712 94.14 199.16 0.23 1288.4 
Log (country population) 712 17.52 1.30 12.36 20.98 
Tourism receipts ($M)  712 13894.13 13472.85 10.00 118629.99 
Log (tourism receipts $M) 712 22.78 1.27 16.12 25.50 
Number of rooms 712 132.51 94.41 5 702.00 
Log (number of rooms) 712 4.67 0.68 1.61 6.55 
Distance (km) to city 712 4835.38 5488.91 225.14 19066.92 
Log (distance (km)) 712 7.66 1.35 5.42 9.86 
Number of hotels in city 712 5.83 7.90 1 43 
 
b) Panel Data 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
41 
DPI Checks 5,357 3.67 1.17 1 8 
World Bank Voice Indicator 5,377 0.90 0.80 -1.86 1.75 
Control of Corruption 5,377 1.20 1.03 -1.39 2.51 
Rule of Law 5,377 0.97 0.90 -1.71 1.97 
Real GDP per capita ($K) 5,386 16.25 10.55 0.11 48.64 
Log (real GDP per capita) 5,386 9.23 1.22 4.69 10.79 
Std. Dev. (GDP – 5 years) 5,385 1.63 1.47 0.22 8.80 
Country Population (Ms) 5,386 76.26 141.52 0.21 1288.40 
Log (country population) 5,386 17.45 1.24 12.25 20.98 
Tourism receipts ($M)  5,386 14834.94 14509.04 0.90 118629.99 
Log (tourism receipts $M) 5,386 22.83 1.37 13.71 25.50 
Number of rooms 5,386 139.49 92.56 5.00 702.00 
Log (number of rooms) 5,386 4.76 0.60 1.61 6.55 
Distance (km) to city 5,386 4270.67 5175.15 225.14 19066.92 
Log (distance (km)) 5,386 7.49 1.37 5.42 9.86 
Number of hotels in city 5,386 6.19 7.64 1 43 
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Table 4: Organizational Form and Local Market Characteristics.  
 
a) New Hotel Sample 
 
  DPI Checks Groups GDP Per Capita Groups 
Organizational 
Form 
1-3 4 5+ Total <=$8,000 $8K-$23K >$23,000 Total 
Company  127 159 52 338 66 142 131 339 
Owned 53.14 53.72 30.41 47.88 23.83 56.80 70.81 47.61 
Management  100 92 65 217 155 81 26 262 
Contract 41.84 31.08 38.01 36.40 55.96 32.40 14.05 36.80 
Franchised  12 45 54 111 56 27 28 111 
  5.02 15.20 31.58 15.72 20.22 10.80 15.14 15.59 
Total 239 296 171 706 277 250 185 712 
 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
b) Panel Data 
 
  DPI Checks Group GDP Per Capita Group 
Organizationa
l Form 
1-3 4 5+ Total <=$8,000 $8K-$23K >$23,000 Total 
Company  990 1,584 483 3,057 454 997 1,614 
3,06
5 
Owned 53.80 64.08 46.22 57.07 24.97 63.62 80.66 
56.9
1 
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Management  772 557 461 1,790 1,136 468 206 
1,81
0 
Contract 41.96 22.53 44.11 33.41 62.49 29.87 10.29 
33.6
1 
Franchised  78 331 101 510 228 102 181 511 
 4.24 13.39 9.67 9.52 12.54 6.51 9.05 9.49 
Total 
1,840 2,472 1,045 5,357 1,818 1,567 2,001 
5,38
6 
 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Note: Number of observations, with percentage of column total in italics.  
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Table 5: Institutional Quality & Organizational Form Choice: New Hotel Sample 
 
 DPI Checks log DPI Checks WB Voice 
 M:C F:C M:C F:C M:C F:C 
Quality of Institutions -0.71* 0.20 -2.22** 0.94 -2.55*** -0.44 
 (0.40) (0.30) (1.06) (0.95) (0.67) (0.83) 
Log (tourism) -0.99*** -0.29 -1.08*** -0.30 -0.83*** -0.42 
 (0.33) (0.37) (0.34) (0.36) (0.32) (0.36) 
Log (distance) 1.86*** 0.07 1.86*** 0.09 1.76*** 0.13 
 (0.42) (0.37) (0.41) (0.37) (0.38) (0.40) 
Local Presence -0.00 -0.04* 0.00 -0.04* 0.01 -0.04* 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Log (population) -0.17 0.29 -0.12 0.30 -0.55* 0.25 
 (0.33) (0.35) (0.31) (0.34) (0.31) (0.33) 
Log (Per Capita GDP) 0.35 -0.12 0.53 -0.15 1.08** 0.25 
 (0.45) (0.46) (0.47) (0.48) (0.53) (0.62) 
StDev (GDP) 0.10 0.37 0.12 0.33 0.07 0.32 
 (0.20) (0.24) (0.21) (0.27) (0.18) (0.24) 
Log (rooms) 0.76** -0.71* 0.71** -0.74* 0.62** -0.65 
 (0.30) (0.39) (0.30) (0.40) (0.30) (0.41) 
Observations 706 706 711 
Brand-Continent FE  Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Year Fixed Effects Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Number Correct 587 588 597 
Percent Correct 83.1 83.3 84.0 
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Note: Robust standard errors in brackets - clustered at the country level. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 6: Impact on the Probabilities of each Organizational Form of a One Standard Deviation 
Increase in the Independent Variable  
(averaged across all observations, holding all other variables constant) 
 
  World Bank DPI Checks Index 
  Company-Owned  Management Contract  Franchised  
Quality of Institutions 0.038 -0.069 0.031 
Log (tourism) 0.098 -0.088 -0.010 
Log (distance) -0.174 0.209 -0.034 
Local Presence 0.017 0.004 -0.021 
Log (population) -0.008 -0.022 0.030 
Log (Per Capita GDP) -0.019 0.033 -0.014 
StDev (GDP) -0.045 0.003 0.042 
Log (rooms) -0.010 0.045 -0.035 
  Log of World Bank DPI Checks Index 
  Company-Owned  Management Contract  Franchised  
Quality of Institutions 0.034 -0.081 0.048 
Log (tourism) 0.105 -0.095 -0.010 
Log (distance) -0.173 0.205 -0.032 
Local Presence 0.016 0.006 -0.022 
Log (population) -0.013 -0.018 0.031 
Log (Per Capita GDP) -0.031 0.050 -0.019 
StDev (GDP) -0.043 0.006 0.037 
Log (rooms) -0.007 0.043 -0.036 
  World Bank Voice and Accountability Indicator 
  Company-Owned  Management Contract  Franchised  
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
47 
Quality of Institutions 0.142 -0.145 0.003 
Log (tourism) 0.093 -0.071 -0.022 
Log (distance) -0.155 0.180 -0.025 
Local Presence 0.010 0.012 -0.022 
Log (population) 0.022 -0.058 0.036 
Log (Per Capita GDP) -0.089 0.089 0.001 
StDev (GDP) -0.037 0.000 0.037 
Log (rooms) -0.004 0.036 -0.032 
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Table 7: Institutional Quality & Organizational Form Choice: Additional Control Variables 
 DPI Checks log DPI Checks WB Voice 
 M:C F:C M:C F:C M:C F:C 
Quality of Institutions -0.79* 0.20 -2.47** 0.89 -4.60*** -1.12 
 (0.42) (0.29) (1.15) (1.01) (0.97) (1.20) 
Control of Corruption -1.99* -2.57** -2.16* -2.48** -1.76* -2.71** 
 (1.21) (1.22) (1.20) (1.21) (0.97) (1.16) 
Rule of Law 3.35** 2.73 3.44** 2.53 5.90*** 3.56* 
 (1.43) (1.76) (1.40) (1.74) (1.61) (1.92) 
Log (tourism) -1.64*** -0.82* -1.76*** -0.81* -2.00*** -0.93** 
 (0.47) (0.48) (0.50) (0.48) (0.59) (0.44) 
Log (distance) 1.87*** -0.09 1.86*** -0.07 1.78*** -0.00 
 (0.42) (0.48) (0.41) (0.47) (0.38) (0.49) 
Local Presence -0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.04* 0.01 -0.04* 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Log (population) 0.44 0.79* 0.49 0.78* 0.48 0.84* 
 (0.37) (0.45) (0.36) (0.45) (0.39) (0.44) 
Log (Per Capita GDP) 0.35 0.65 0.61 0.64 0.65 0.83 
 (0.68) (0.73) (0.73) (0.76) (0.59) (0.73) 
StDev (GDP) 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.29 0.13 0.26 
 (0.22) (0.27) (0.23) (0.31) (0.22) (0.29) 
Log (rooms) 0.78** -0.79* 0.74** -0.82** 0.77** -0.73 
 (0.32) (0.40) (0.31) (0.41) (0.37) (0.45) 
Observations 706 706 711 
Brand-Continent FE  Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
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Year Fixed Effects Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Number Correct 591  593 
Percent Correct 83.7  84.0 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 8: Impact on the Probabilities of each Organizational Form of a One Standard Deviation 
Increase in the Independent Variable  
(averaged across all observations, holding all other variables constant) 
 
  World Bank DPI Checks Index 
  Company-Owned  Management Contract  Franchised  
Quality of Institutions 0.042 -0.073 0.031 
Control of Corruption 0.232 -0.127 -0.105 
Rule of Law -0.288 0.169 0.118 
Log (tourism) 0.177 -0.135 -0.042 
Log (distance) -0.161 0.204 -0.043 
Local Presence 0.015 0.002 -0.017 
Log (population) -0.092 0.024 0.068 
Log (Per Capita GDP) -0.067 0.018 0.049 
StDev (GDP) -0.043 0.007 0.036 
Log (rooms) -0.008 0.045 -0.037 
  Log of World Bank DPI Checks Index 
  Company-Owned  Management Contract  Franchised  
Quality of Institutions 0.040 -0.086 0.046 
Control of Corruption 0.240 -0.139 -0.102 
Rule of Law -0.282 0.181 0.101 
Log (tourism) 0.185 -0.144 -0.041 
Log (distance) -0.158 0.199 -0.041 
Local Presence 0.014 0.005 -0.019 
Log (population) -0.094 0.029 0.065 
Log (Per Capita GDP) -0.083 0.041 0.043 
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StDev (GDP) -0.038 0.009 0.030 
Log (rooms) -0.005 0.043 -0.038 
  World Bank Voice and Accountability Indicator 
  Company-Owned  Management Contract  Franchised  
Quality of Institutions 0.238 -0.219 -0.018 
Control of Corruption 0.212 -0.100 -0.111 
Rule of Law -0.367 0.288 0.079 
Log (tourism) 0.197 -0.151 -0.046 
Log (distance) -0.137 0.170 -0.033 
Local Presence 0.011 0.010 -0.021 
Log (population) -0.096 0.023 0.073 
Log (Per Capita GDP) -0.094 0.034 0.060 
StDev (GDP) -0.036 0.008 0.027 
Log (rooms) -0.005 0.040 -0.035 
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Table 9: Institutional Quality & Organizational Form Choice: Panel Data 
 DPI Checks log DPI Checks WB Voice 
 M:C F:C M:C F:C M:C F:C 
Quality of Institutions -0.37* 0.10 -1.48** 0.54 -2.87*** -0.30 
 (0.22) (0.23) (0.69) (0.92) (0.52) (1.50) 
Control of Corruption -0.88 -2.16** -1.10 -2.26** -1.15* -2.08** 
 (0.68) (1.05) (0.71) (1.04) (0.60) (1.00) 
Rule of Law 0.63 1.49 0.96 1.61 2.61*** 1.55 
 (0.76) (1.43) (0.79) (1.42) (0.92) (1.27) 
Log (tourism) -0.33 -0.65 -0.49 -0.67 -0.49 -0.73* 
 (0.32) (0.41) (0.33) (0.42) (0.37) (0.43) 
Log (distance) 1.00*** 0.02 1.02*** 0.02 0.89*** 0.07 
 (0.17) (0.22) (0.18) (0.23) (0.20) (0.20) 
Local Presence 0.01 -0.06** 0.01 -0.06** 0.02 -0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Log (population) -0.24 0.51 -0.12 0.53 -0.15 0.55 
 (0.26) (0.36) (0.26) (0.36) (0.23) (0.39) 
Log (Per Capita GDP) 0.04 0.81 0.21 0.83 0.25 0.92 
 (0.52) (0.58) (0.53) (0.60) (0.52) (0.63) 
StDev (GDP) 0.30* 0.36** 0.30* 0.33* 0.24* 0.38** 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.13) (0.18) 
Log (rooms) 0.06 -0.70 0.03 -0.73* -0.10 -0.73* 
 (0.21) (0.43) (0.21) (0.43) (0.20) (0.44) 
Observations 5,356 5,356 5,376 
Brand-Continent FE  Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
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Year Fixed Effects Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Number Correct 4309 4319 4383 
Percent Correct 80.5 80.6 81.5 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A1: Additional Robustness Regressions: New Hotel Sample. 
 
  Non-Parametric WB Political Stability Political Constraint 
  M:C F:C M:C F:C M:C F:C 
Checks         
  
 
        
  
Checks^2         
  
 
        
  
Checks==2 -4.15*** -1.94     
  
 
(1.16) (1.29)     
  
Checks==3 -2.49 -0.69     
  
 
(1.38) (1.46)     
  
Checks==4 -3.80*** 0.14     
  
 
(1.33) (1.59)     
  
Checks==5 -3.96*** 0.43     
  
 
(1.36) (1.31)     
  
Checks==6 -5.82*** -15.88***     
  
 
(1.92) (2.04)     
  
Checks==7 -22.58*** -16.05***     
  
 
(2.78) (1.82)     
  
WB Political Stability     -2.12*** -1.99**   
 
    (0.66) (0.98)   
Political Constraint     
  
-4.70*** 0.81 
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(1.59) (2.32) 
Observations 706 704 711 
Brand-Continent FE Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Year FE Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Number Correct 596 592 594 
Percent correct 84.4 84.1 83.5 
Notes: All regressions include the set of variables and fixed effects in Table 5. Robust standard errors, clustered 
at the country level, in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The WB 
political Stability index is available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. The Political 
Constraint index, developed by Witold Henisz, is available at http://www-
management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/. 
 
